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Abstract
JOHN P. LAPPIE: Partisan or Quasi-Partisan?
(Under the direction of Thomas M. Carsey.)
Formally non-partisan judicial elections have traditionally been more-or-less bereft of partisan-
ship, with votes and results hinging upon candidate quality (Schaffner et al., 2001; Dubois, 1980,
1978). However, regulations limiting judicial candidates’ speech in formally non-partisan elec-
tions have fared poorly in the federal courts in the 2000s. This has lead to the rise of what I term
quasi-partisan judicial elections, or formally non-partisan elections in which at least one of the
candidates runs a campaign based on partisan appeals. I examine the effects of quasi-partisan
campaigns on the structure of voting and find that precinct-level partisanship is a stronger
predictor of judicial vote share in quasi-partisan elections than in truly non-partisan elections.
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Introduction
Unusually, the United States elects many of its state and local level judges, but these judicial
elections are not all alike. Some are retention elections, others contested; some are partisan, and
others are non-partisan. The purpose of a non-partisan election is to prevent voters from making
their decisions on the basis of personal partisanship; rather, voters would be forced to rely on
different, normatively better cues (Scaffner et al., 2001). However, partisan cues have become
available in non-partisan judicial elections. In the Republican Party of Minnesota vs. White
(2002), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down judicial canon preventing judicial candidates in non-
partisan elections from announcing their issue positions. Within short order, canon prohibiting
judicial candidates from announcing their party affiliation also were struck down by various state
courts and finally the Federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (2005).1 As a result, candidates
for judge have run announcing themselves to be pro-life (for instance), or even calling themselves
Republicans or Democrats.
There has been much empirical study of these “new style” judicial elections, and also an
extensive normative debate (see Bonneau and Hall, 2009; and Geyh, 2003). In this paper, I
examine the effects of what I term quasi-partisan judicial elections on the behavior of voters. By
quasi-partisan, I mean a formally non-partisan election wherein one or more judicial candidates
run a clearly partisan campaign.
The defense of judicial elections, particularly those that have arisen since White, has rested
on the proposition that voters will be better able to cast relatively informed ballots, and thus
hold the judiciary accountable (see Rock and Baum, 2010; Hall and Bonneau, 2009). Essentially,
the thinking is that citizens will be able to cast more informed ballots if they have a partisan cue
to rely upon. Since non-partisan judicial elections obviously lack a party label on the ballot, this
would require that at least some voters hear and understand the partisan campaign messages
coming from candidates, and that those voters respond accordingly. Notably, there is a literature
that considers the possibility that judicial elections, particularly the quasi-partisan or otherwise
increasingly bitter type that have arisen since White are undermining judicial independence and
public confidence in the judiciary (see Gibson, 2009; Schotland, 2003). The results of these
studies have been mixed. But if quasi-partisan elections promote accountability, then this is
a potential positive to weigh against the potential negatives noted by Gibson and Schotland,
among others.2
1 The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal, effectively upholding the Eighth Circuit’s ruling.
2 There are those who would disagree that increased accountability in the judiciary is positive; the argument
centers around the notion of a tradeoff between judicial independence and judicial accountability. For an example
of a defense of judicial elections, see Hall and Bonnaeau, 2009. For an example of a critique, see Geyh, 2003.
Quasi-Partisan Campaigns and Voter Response
Political science has mostly rejected the notion that the partisan structure to voting is a
function of citizens studying the issues in depth and just tending to agree with candidates from
their party. After all, the average citizen knows very little about politics (see Campbell et al,
1960.), and really has little incentive to learn (see Downs, 1957). The probability that a single
vote will be decisive is infinitesimally small, and yet, despite the fact that citizens on average are
politically ignorant, they do tend to vote in line with their preferences. The accepted explanation
is that citizens utilize the party heuristic (see Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; Aldrich, 1995). To cast
a reasonably intelligent ballot, a voter does not need to gather information about the candidates
in an election. A voter need only know which political party the voter’s positions are closest to,
and which candidate belongs to that party. The United States lacks the strict party discipline
common to most democracies, so this is not a universally successful strategy. Still, if citizens
were to cast all their votes for their preferred party’s candidate, they would vote in line with
their preferences the vast majority of the time (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001).
However, there are dangers in using simple heuristics. For the partisan voter to actually cast
a ballot in line with his or her preferences, he or she would have to actually know what the
party stands for. Ellis and Stimson (2012) argue that in fact, voters often do not know what
parties stand for or what ideological labels mean. They find that many voters are conflicted;
most common are symbolic conservatives who actually hold liberal issue positions. Coupled
with polarization, this ignorance of what ideology and partisanship actually mean could result
in party-line voters casting ballots incongruent with their actual issue positions.
There are dangers to not having a party heuristic as well. In the era of Democratic dominance
in the South, the Democratic primary was tantamount to election; but while the candidates stood
for differing positions and interests, most voters could not discern them. This meant that the
electorate could not hold its elected officials accountable for failure, leaving the Southern states
poorly governed (see Key, 1950). Key asserts that the best governed Southern state was North
Carolina, attributable to the state’s relatively viable Republican party.
Republican voters generally vote for Republican candidates while Democratic voters generally
vote for Democratic candidates. However, many elections do not have party labels on the ballot.
The purpose of a non-partisan election is to prevent citizens from voting based on their party
affiliation (Schaffner et al., 2001). Reformers claimed that by denying citizens the party heuristic,
voters would instead cast their ballots based on different, presumably better, cues (Schaffner et
al., 2001). In non-partisan state Supreme Court elections, this theory seemed to hold. Excepting
a few cases where former governors ran for their state’s supreme court, Dubois (1980, 1978) could
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not find any evidence of a partisan structure to voting. Instead, the most important predictors
of vote share were ABA (American Bar Association) ratings of candidates and incumbency (see
also Goldstein, 1979). So in the case of judicial elections, non-partisan elections achieved their
purpose. This was not without a cost; faced with uncertainty about what the candidates stand
for, fewer citizens participate in non-partisan than partisan judicial elections (Hall and Bonneau,
2009).
Citizen Knowledge in Judicial Elections
The average citizen does not know the ABA ratings of State Supreme Court candidates. How
then to explain the results of Dubois and Goldstein? First, there is the subset of the population
for whom the names of the incumbent justices are familiar. Second, certain subsets of the
population, such as legal professionals, are liable to know and care about ABA ratings. Since
there is considerable ballot roll-off in non-partisan judicial elections (see Hall and Bonneau, 2009;
Hall, 2007), these groups may well have an effect beyond their numbers. Dubois (1980) suggested
that uninformed voters may vote more or less at random; if true, this would tend to give even
greater importance to those segments of the population who are informed and persuadable (see
Erikson et al., 2002).
It is possible that some voters will still cast ballots based on partisanship even in low-
information non-partisan elections. Judicial candidates have personal partisanships, and in-
quisitive citizens may be able to discern them. There is some evidence that this is the case.
Rock and Baum’s (2010) study of state supreme court elections in Ohio found that even in low-
visibility campaigns there was some partisan voting, particularly among the higher educated.3
This is not to say that Dubois was wrong. Ohio has partisan primaries (though non-partisan
general elections), which means that the partisan leanings of judicial candidates are not hidden.
Rock and Baum did note that their findings did not necessarily transfer to truly non-partisan
judicial election systems, though they speculated that visibility might matter even more in those
cases than in Ohio.4
3 Education is not the same thing as political sophistication; it is merely a correlate. However, with aggregate
data education is the best available proxy.
4 Rock and Baum’s argument centers around the idea that in Ohio, citizens are used to considering their
judges as partisans and are typically aware of judicial partisanships, and that more visible campaigns tend to
make citizens aware of information other than party affiliation. However in truly non-partisan states, more visible
campaigns would tend to result in making voters aware of judicial partisanship. This study considers a similar
effect, though based less on visibility of the election than the mere fact that candidates are openly promoting
their partisanship.
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Partisan Information in Non-Partisan Campaigns; The Available Evidence
The lack of a party label on the ballot does not in itself prevent openly partisan campaigns.
Thus, advocates of non-partisan elections encouraged states to adopt regulations preventing
judicial candidates from announcing their partisanship, their political beliefs, or how they would
rule on potential cases. However, the White decisions did away with these regulations, and it
is now possible for candidates in non-partisan systems to run partisan, ideological, or at least
issue-based campaigns.
For a quasi-partisan campaign to actually have an effect on voting, citizens have to actually
consume information from judicial campaigns. Looking at Ohio Supreme Court general elections,
which are non-partisan, Rock and Baum (2010) determined that partisan voting is greater,
especially among the educated, when the election is relatively more visible. Rock and Baum
attributed this to citizens learning more when the campaign is more visible. As previously
noted, Ohio is a rather special case because the non-partisan general elections for the Supreme
Court are preceded by partisan primaries. Rock and Baum suggest that visible partisan general
election campaigning might matter even more in states that do not have partisan primaries.
However, Rock and Baum did not have data from purely non-partisan states, and thus could
not provide evidence for this speculation.
It is theoretically possible that the public would not care about partisan information, and
that they might in fact be repulsed by it (Schotland, 2003). After all, Americans are taught in
civics courses that the judges are neutral, apolitical figures; so they theoretically could find it
unbecoming for judicial candidate to talk about personal partisanship. This idea is not borne
out empirically. Squire and Smith (1988) made use of a unique 1982 poll by California Polling
in which the pollsters asked respondents about their voting intentions in the various California
Supreme Court retention elections being held that year. Half of the respondents were simply
asked if they would vote to retain a particular justice, while the other half of the sample were also
told which Governor, Reagan or Brown, had appointed that justice; this served as a partisan cue.
Squire and Smith found that respondents who were told which governor had appointed which
justices were much more likely to state a voting intention in line with their personal partisanship.
A Theory of Voting Structure in Quasi-Partisan Judicial Elections
Through the efforts of the aforementioned scholars, the discipline has attained some evidence
that voters: (a) are willing to vote for judicial candidates on the basis of party, even in truly non-
partisan systems, and (b) consume at least some information emanating from the campaigns.
I expect this pattern to hold in states that have more traditional non-partisan judicial election
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systems.
In contrast to the findings of Dubois (1980, 1978), it is expected that there will be some
partisan structure to voting even when there is no quasi-partisan campaigning. That is, when
candidates really are running campaigns emphasizing personal experience rather than issues, I
expect some partisan cues to seep through to at least some voters. Some voters actually care
about judicial elections, and it stands to reason that this number has increased since Dubois’s
study. Many inherently political issues, especially social issues, have been fought over in the
courts. Lawyers and legal professionals have always been attentive to state Supreme Court
elections. Now, ideological activists have also become involved, and we might reasonably expect
those persons to be attentive enough to cast partisan ballots. In addition, the role of technology
should not be overlooked. With the rise of the internet, the common citizen now has access to
much more information than in the past. In all likelihood, most citizens will not make the effort;
but it is much easier to find evidence of a judicial candidate’s partisanship today than it was
when Dubois did his research.
H1: Partisanship will structure voting in formally non-partisan state Supreme Court elections
even when none of the candidates run a partisan or ideologically oriented campaign.
Most citizens are not lawyers or party activists. They generally lack the skills to discern the
true partisan and/or ideological leanings of the candidates. Further, most citizens are unlikely
to make the effort. What if the election were not truly non-partisan, but rather quasi-partisan?
Then partisan cues becomes an active part of the campaign, not something voters need to dig
deeply to find.
It is possible, as Rock and Baum (2010) suggest, that particularly partisan judicial elections
in non-partisan states would draw more media attention, thus raising their visibility. However,
the key element is not the potential for a more visible contest, but rather the fact that the judicial
candidates, or at least some of them, will be offering a very easy cue: “I am a Republican” or
“I am a conservative”, for instance. The common citizen does not have to be very proactive or
very sophisticated to receive and process these types of cues.
If more citizens receive partisan information in quasi-partisan elections, it is reasonable to
expect that more citizens will cast their ballots in line with their partisan preferences. It is
important to note that not all citizens would do this; some citizens do not pay attention at
all to the campaigns, tuning them out until it comes time to vote. Others may simply forget
which candidate was their co-partisan, since judicial elections are so low profile. So, while this
is not tested here, the partisan structure of voting would likely be greater in the openly partisan
judicial election systems than in quasi-partisan elections.
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H2: The partisan structure to voting in formally non-partisan state Supreme Court elections
will be stronger when the election is quasi-partisan.
Control Variables: The Usual Suspects
Other variables may have an influence on the structure of voting in judicial elections, with
or without a quasi-partisan campaign. These variables are not the primary focus of this paper,
but must be controlled for in order to ensure confidence in the results.
The first variable is education. Higher education is generally correlated with greater liberalism
(Katz, 2007) which in this era can be more or less equated with support for the Democratic party.
Thus, higher education would tend to correlate negatively with voting for Republican candidates.
The second variable is income. Higher earners are more likely to be Republicans, since
the Republican party tends to favor the interests of wealthier citizens (Gelman, 2008; Gross
and Goidel, 2003). Similarly, lower income persons tend to favor the Democratic party, since
the Democrats promote policies intended to aid those with lower incomes (Katz, 2007). Thus,
income would tend to correlate positively with voting for Republican candidates.
The third variable is race. The largest non-Caucasian groups in the U.S. are African-
Americans and Hispanics, both of whom tend to favor the Democratic party, though less so
for Hispanics (Luks and Elms, 2005; Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003). Thus, even disregarding other
variables, racial minorities would tend to support Democratic rather than Republican candidates
for state supreme court.
The fourth variable is population. More urban, densely populated areas tend to be more
supportive of Democratic candidates then are rural voters (Gimpel and Shuckneckt, 2002).
Data and Methods
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this study is the percentage of the vote at the precinct level for
the ’Republican’ candidate for State Supreme Court (see the section on case selection). The data
sources are the various Secretaries of State, Divisions of Elections, or equivalent offices from the
cases used in this study.
These data, and the data for the key explanatory variable, are at the aggregate level. Partially
this is a result of practical constraints; as best this author can tell, there is no available poll or
survey for these elections from which individual level data could be gathered. More importantly,
this study is interested in actual vote choice, and such data is available only at the aggregate
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level.
Independent Variables
One of the key independent variables is the partisanship of the precinct, as measured by the
percentage of the vote for the Republican candidate in the most recent presidential election. The
ideal measure of this concept would be the percentage of residents in a precinct who identified
as Republicans, but such data at the precinct level does not exist. Another potential measure
would be party registration at the precinct level, but many states (such as Minnesota) do not
have partisan registration. Thus, Republican presidential vote is used as the best available
substitute. This is in line with the methodology of Schaffner et al. (2007), who, when studying
non-partisan elections, utilized the vote share for Gore in 2000 as their measure of precinct-level
Democratic partisanship.
An alternative measure would have been to use gubernatorial vote; however, such a measure
could be misleading. Every gubernatorial election has idiosyncrasies. So, of course, do presiden-
tial elections. However every state is in involved in the same presidential election, while every
state is involved with a different gubernatorial election. For instance, if one state’s gubernatorial
election featured a moderate Republican and a moderate Democrat, that would be much differ-
ent from an election in a state featuring two polarized candidates. The latter state would give a
sharper measure for partisanship than the first, which would distort the results of my analysis.
Thus, presidential vote is used.
The other key feature to measure is whether or not the Supreme Court election was quasi-
partisan, (coded 1 if yes, 0 if no). There is a lengthy discussion of the criteria for this designation
in the next section.
The key independent variable is the interaction of precinct-level partisanship and the quasi-
partisan dummy. If the hypotheses presented earlier are correct, I would expect this interaction
to be of substantive importance well beyond that of partisanship on its own.
I measure the four precinct-level control variables as follows: (1) education, measured as the
percentage of the population in the precinct with a Bachelor’s degree or higher; (2) income,
measured as the median household income of the precinct in question; (3) non-white population,
measured by the percentage of the population in each precinct that are not non-Hispanic whites;
(4) population, as measured by the total number of persons living in that precinct.5
Dummies for each individual contest were also included in the model. These dummies account
5 The source for all these data is the American Community Survey, though mediated through David Bradlee
in the case of race.
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both for idiosyncrasies in the contest, but also for the effects of state and the effects of year.
Case Selection and Sample Size
Due to limitations in the available data, it is not possible to include every state Supreme
Court election since the White decisions. Due to limitations in resources, this project is also
unable to include every precinct in those elections that are sampled as cases. Rather, a random
sample of precincts is taken from each selected election. This sample has five contests from
Minnesota, three from Montana, two from North Carolina, and one from Idaho.
The quasi-partisan contests were selected on a simple basis: namely, did one or more of the
candidates involved in the race make blatantly partisan appeals to the electorate? This could
be demonstrated via advertisements, public speaking engagements, or through giving the party
label a prominent place on the candidate’s website. Furthermore, the Brenann Center, which
is opposed to the style of judicial elections that has arisen post-White, will often comment on
such campaigns. Generally, a candidate running a blatantly partisan campaign in a non-partisan
election system is news, and will receive press coverage. This is not necessarily the case however;
Barbara Jackson’s 2010 run for the North Carolina Supreme Court was quasi-partisan, but
received only three mentions in the Raleigh News and Observer in the year before her election.
Barbara Jackson’s successful bid for the North Carolina Supreme Court is a good example
of a quasi-partisan campaign. Jackson ran commercial advertisements in which she proclaimed
herself the conservative choice for the Supreme Court.6 Jackson also appeared in television ads
with the state’s leading elected Republican, U.S. Senator Richard Burr. Jackson even shared
Senator Burr’s campaign infrastructure: a Burr speaking engagement would be immediately
followed by a Jackson speaking engagement. At these speeches, Jackson would refer to herself
as the only Republican candidate for the North Carolina Supreme Court.7
The truly non-partisan cases have more stringent standards. If a candidate declines to an-
nounce his or her partisanship, it can be hard, years after the fact, to discover what it was.
Furthermore, the absence of evidence of a quasi-partisan campaign is not proof that there was
no quasi-partisan campaign. It was possible, though not likely, that a scholar looking for evi-
dence of a quasi-partisan campaign might just miss it, an unacceptable risk when selecting only
eleven cases for a study. Thusly, direct evidence of the campaign actually being non-partisan was
needed for a contest to be included in this analysis. However, this creates a practical problem: a
candidate running a non-partisan campaign in a state with non-partisan elections is not normally
6 “Judge Barbara Jackson: True Conservative for Supreme Court.”’ Paid for by Citizens for Judge Barbara
Jackson
7 Barbara Jackson, speech to the Franklin County (NC) Republicans, Oct. 2, 2010. In this speech, Justice
Jackson refers also to the support given to her campaign by U.S. Senator Richard Burr (R-NC).
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newsworthy. When it becomes newsworthy, it is often to note the contrast with quasi-partisan
elections.
For example, consider Minnesota Justice Lori Gildea’s re-election campaign in 2008. Jus-
tice Gildea was coded as a Republican because she was appointed to the court by Republican
Governor Tim Pawlenty, and because of Democrats later criticizing Gildea’s promotion to Chief
Justice by Pawlenty (Dunbar and Nelson, 2010). Justice Gildea’s campaign was easily labeled
as non-partisan because the press and professional associations (namely Lawyers of Hennepin
County) noted that both her campaign and that of her opponent were truly non-partisan. This
was contrasted to judicial elections in nearby Wisconsin which were quasi-partisan (Soule, 2008).
The selected cases constitute a convenient sample, not a random sample; as such, there are
potential issues worth noting. A large portion of the cases (5/11) are from Minnesota. Further,
of the five truly non-partisan cases, four are from Minnesota. It is technically possible that
the results of this study could be driven by an idiosyncrasy within Minnesota itself. To this, I
offer three defenses. The first is a practical one: this is the best sample that could be attained
given the limitations in the data sources. The second is that, excepting the North Carolina
cases, Minnesota is reasonably close, in a cultural sense, to the other cases. For instance,
just as Minnesotans were surprised by Greg Wersal’s decision to run as an open Republican
in 2000 and in 2010 (see the White decisions, and Karnowski, 2010), Don Eismann’s blatantly
partisan campaign against incumbent Chief Justice Cathy Silak was considered a surprise in
2000 (Brennan Center, 2000). In short, these states (excepting North Carolina) have a tradition
of truly non-partisan judicial elections. Finally, I tested for this possibility by running diagnostic
regressions, and the results lead me to believe that my analysis is not driven by Minnesota (see
Appendix).
It is worthwhile to note why other states with non-partisan judicial election systems are not
included in this analysis. Ohio and Michigan are rejected because of their partisan primaries.
Arkansas and Georgia are rejected because the precinct designation for election results did not
comport with the precinct designations at the University of Missouri’s GEOCORR project,
meaning that those precincts could not be matched to census tracts. Washington state is rejected
as it does not report precinct level results at all. Kentucky and Mississippi are rejected due to
having districts rather than statewide elections, and Wisconsin is rejected for having odd-year
elections.
This study does not control for the unique effects of media exposure and campaign spending.
This is not to say that those variables are unimportant, but there are no available measures at
the precinct level, only at the state level. Thus, any measure for these concepts would correlate
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perfectly with the contest-level dummies. Thus, the contest dummies capture these (and any
other) un-modeled effects at the contest, year, and state level. I am merely unable to report the
unique effects of these variables.
Methodology
In all states except Idaho8 , the same precincts are re-sampled for every contest. The depen-
dent variable, and possibly the partisanship variable (if a different presidential election is more
proximate) may vary, but the controls do not. However, there are also idiosyncrasies within these
precincts that can affect the dependent variable. Since these precincts appear multiple times in
the data set, these effects must be controlled for. This analysis is done via an OLS Multi-Level
Random Effects Model, with the random effects being at the precinct level. The coefficients are
interpreted the same way as in the basic OLS model.
Results
Table 2: OLS Random Effects Results, Abridged
Variable Coefficient
(p-value)
Precinct Partisanship 0.143
(0.000)
Precinct Partisanship:Quasi-Partisan 0.362
(0.000)
Non-White 0.109
(0.000)
Education -0.008
(0.555)
Population 0.0005
(0.000)
Overall R-squared = .6684
N = 2,338 observations in 860 groups
P-values are two-tailed
Note that in Table 2, only the theoretically interesting results are included (i.e., the contest
dummies are not reported here). For the full results, see the appendix.
Precinct-level Republican partisanship exerts a statistically significant and positive effect
on the percentage of the vote won by the Republican candidate for Justice. Mathematically,
this coefficient represents the effect of Republican partisanship when there is no quasi-partisan
election. Thus, for an increase of one percent in Republican partisanship there is, ceteris paribus,
8 Since only one case from Idaho is included in the sample.
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an estimated increase of .143 percent in the dependent variable when the election is truly non-
partisan. This lends further credence to the findings of Rock and Baum (2010). Precinct-level
partisanship exerts an effect on Republican judicial vote even in the absence of a quasi-partisan
election. It should be noted that while this effect is statistically significant, it is not very large
compared to the effect of partisanship when there is a quasi-partisan campaign.
The interaction of quasi-partisan election and precinct-level partisanship is statistically sig-
nificant and positive. Mathematically, the coefficient for the interaction should be added to the
coefficient of the precinct partisanship variable; this sum yields the average effect of precinct
partisanship when there is a quasi-partisan election. Thus, the marginal effect of precinct par-
tisanship on Republican judicial vote is .505 when there is a quasi-partisan election, ceteris
paribus.9
The education measure is not statistically significant or substantively important. Income was
left out of the model due to co-linearity with education.10 Non-white population is statistically
significant and positively associated with the dependent variable. This appears to be an artifact
of the analysis; race becomes significant and negatively associated with Republican judicial
vote (as predicted) if partisanship is left out of the model. Precinct population is statistically
significant and positively related to Republican judicial vote. The coefficient indicates that for
a one unit increase in population (which is to say, an increase of one person), on average the
Republican candidate will receive an increase of .0005 percent in his or her vote share, ceteris
paribus.11 The effect is real but not really substantial; it would indicate that for the Republican
candidate to receive a one percent increase in his or her vote share from the effects of population,
there would need to be an increase of 2,000 persons in precinct population.
The contest variables are not theoretically interesting; the baseline category is Barbara Jack-
son’s 2010 campaign for the North Carolina Supreme Court.
To show the substantive importance of the partisanship coefficients in a more intuitive fashion,
I multiply the coefficients by one standard deviation of partisanship (17.6). In a truly non-
partisan contest, for a 17.6 percent increase in Republican partisanship, there would be an
estimated 2.51 percent increase in Republican judicial vote share (at the precinct level). Similarly,
for a 17.6 percent decrease in Republican partisanship, we would expect a corresponding 2.51
percent decrease in Republican judicial vote. While the effect is real, it is relatively small.
9 To give an idea of the substantive importance of this, the mean of precinct level Republican partisanship is
50.6; one standard deviation is 17.6. The maximum is 90, and the minimum 0.6.
10 However, in models run with income instead of education, income was also non-significant and insubstantial.
Changing which of the two, education or income, is present has no substantial impact on the other variables
11 To give an idea of the substantive importance, the mean of precinct population is 2,074.9; one standard
deviation is 1,618. The maximum is 15,216; the minimum is 39.
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The effect is larger when a quasi-partisan campaign is run.12 For an increase of 17.6 percent
in precinct-level Republican partisanship, it is estimated that the Republican judicial candidate
would receive an increased vote share of 8.88 percent. Similarly, for a decrease of 17.6 percent
in precinct-level Republican partisanship, it is estimated that the Republican judicial candidate
would see a decrease of 8.88 percent in vote share.
This indicates that there is a substantive difference in the effect of precinct-partisanship on
the dependent variable based on the type of election. The structure of voting at the precinct
level appears to become more partisan when the election is quasi-partisan. Of course, the effect
works both ways. If the election is quasi-partisan, Republican areas give more of their votes
to Republican candidates, but Democratic areas also give less of their votes to Republican
candidates.
Discussion
Quasi-Partisan Elections: The Implications
This study has provided evidence that the structure of voting at the precinct level becomes
more partisan when there is a quasi-partisan judicial election. The analysis is at the aggregate
level. I have not, in a technical sense, demonstrated that a quasi-partisan election results in
individual voters casting their ballots in a partisan fashion. Still, if the structure of precinct-
level voting has become more partisan in quasi-partisan elections, the most likely explanation is
that more Republicans are voting for the Republican candidate and more Democrats are voting
for the Democratic candidate.
These findings appear to be the result of campaign effects. In a quasi-partisan campaign,
at least one of the candidates makes a clear appeal based on their partisan and/or ideological
leanings. This in essence a partisan message: “I am a Republican”, for instance. At least some
citizens receive this message and respond to it when they go to cast their ballots. Not all citizens
of course; there is not a 1-to-1 correspondence between precinct partisanship and Republican
judicial vote. A Republican running a quasi-partisan election could expect 8.88 percent of the
vote more in a 67 percent Republican precinct than in a 50 percent Republican precinct, not 17
percent more.
From one perspective, this is a positive development. Were this paper discussing presidential,
congressional, or mayoral elections, few would dispute if I said a Republican identifier voting for
12 Since this is an interaction, I multiply the standard deviation change (17.6) by the sum of the coefficient for
partisanship on its own and the coefficient for the interaction term.
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the Republican candidate was rational13 . A major concern in formally non-partisan judicial
elections is how citizens can cast meaningful, or at least informed, ballots in line with their
preferences (see Dubois, 1980, 1978). This paper provides evidence that the electorate’s vote
falls more predictably in line with their partisan preferences when the election is actually quasi-
partisan.
The critic may argue that in fact this is not rational; that judges are in some way inherently
different from other elected officials. However, if we accept that judges essentially make policy
and also have policy goals (see Collins, 2007; Segal and Spaeth, 1993), then the electorate’s
reaction to quasi-partisan elections is perfectly rational. If judges are going to be policymakers,
it is perfectly reasonable for a Republican voter to want Republican judges. Hall and Bonneau, in
particular, have defended judicial elections on the basis that the judiciary should be responsive
and accountable to the public. In a partisan election this is relatively easy; if the electorate
becomes more Republican, they can throw out their Democratic judges and put in Republican
ones. In a truly non-partisan election it can be somewhat harder. After all, the goal of non-
partisan elections is to force citizens to rely on better cues than party affiliation (Schaffner et
al., 2001).
The purpose of holding a non-partisan judicial election is to force voters to rely on cues other
than party. Before White, the party heuristic truly was suppressed. However, the advent of
quasi-partisan elections prevents formally non-partisan election systems from attaining this goal.
Quasi-partisan elections were not unknown pre-White, but they have become more prevalent
since the regulations of judicial candidate conduct were struck down. American politics have
become increasingly polarized, and weighty political issues are often decided in the courts. Given
this, it is probable that there will be more, not fewer, quasi-partisan elections in the future. By
definition then, for good or ill, White has undermined non-partisan judicial election systems.
Applicability to Other Non-Partisan Elections
This study has examined non-partisan judicial elections, but there are other non-partisan
elections in the United States. While it is possible that there is something special about judicial
elections, it seems likely that these findings can be applied to other non-partisan elections. If
the structure of voting becomes more partisan in reaction to quasi-partisan judicial elections,
the same will likely occur in non-judicial non-partisan elections. It is possible that the effect
will be even greater. In civics courses, American students have been taught the benefits of an
13 Two persons who might dispute this contention are Ellis and Stimson (2012), who argue that many Ameri-
cans (in particular Republicans) have partisan and ideological identifications out of step with their actual issue
positions. This is an area worthy of further research, but is beyond the scope of this project.
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independent and neutral judiciary. Thus, some citizens may have qualms about voting for judges
on the basis of partisanship. Those same people, however, may be less likely to feel an aversion
to voting for mayor, city councilor, or the Nebraska Legislature based on partisanship. This is
speculation; further study is warranted.
Implications for the Study of Judicial Elections
As noted by Bonneau and Cann (2011), judicial elections are interesting in part because
of the variability in the election process. Members of Congress are all chosen in the same
fashion; the vast majority of governors and state legislators are chosen in the same fashion. Part
of the interest in judicial elections stems from our ability to analyze the effect of the various
electoral institutions. The findings presented here show that studies of judicial elections should
go beyond the differing electoral institutions. As a result of overturning the regulations on
judicial candidate speech, not all non-partisan judicial elections are really non-partisan. These
quasi-partisan elections were not unknown pre-White, but are now more prevalent. Because they
are now prevalent and have an effect on voting, they should be treated as a distinct category of
judicial election.
Speculation for Future Study
While there is evidence that quasi-partisan elections matter, there are a few questions about
which to speculate. How do voters receive this message? While many scholars have studied and
criticized increased spending in judicial elections (see Geyh, 2003; Chemerinsky, 1998), these
elections remain relatively low budget and low profile compared to other state elections. A
judicial candidate may run television advertisements, but unless they’re spending a particularly
large amount of money14 , they probably will not air many, or at least not air many at prime
times in prime locations. After all, according to a 2009 Elon University Poll,forty percent of
North Carolinians did not even realize their state has judicial elections (Elon, 2009).15 If the
respondents did not realize their state has judicial elections, they must not recall having seen
the judicial campaign.
This explains why there is not a perfect, or near-perfect, correspondence of precinct parti-
sanship and Republican judicial vote. Some citizens never hear the campaign, and so cannot
respond to it. It seems probable that those who respond to the quasi-partisan campaigns are
neither high-sophisticates nor low-sophisticates.16 High sophisticates are more likely to take
14 None of the candidates in my sample, nor their opponents, spent particularly large amounts of money.
15 Elon University Poll conducted November 16-19, 2009. Survey of 563 North Carolina adult residents.
16 Zaller (1992) makes this argument at the individual level.
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the time to learn about the candidates even in truly non-partisan contests. Low sophisticates
simply pay no attention at all, figuratively and possibly literally tuning out the campaign.
More work is needed. However, it is worth noting that citizens do not need to be at a
loss when voting in elections without party labels on the ballot. Typically, if there is no party
cue, then citizens become confused by the ballot, not knowing who stands for what, limiting
accountability and leading to poor governance (see Key, 1950). The positive of this study is that
behavior by candidates can lead to more informed voting in non-partisan elections; however, this
seems to require a quasi-partisan campaign. The question then is whether or not campaigns
can get large numbers of citizens to cast rational ballots without making partisan or ideological
appeals. If they cannot do so, then truly non-partisan and even quasi-partisan elections are
different in only one regard from formally partisan elections: the former discriminate against the
less sophisticated voter.
Given the low profile of judicial campaigns, it is possible that it is not just exposure to the
campaigns themselves that explains the increased partisan structure of voting. There are other
explanations. Perhaps the political parties themselves become more active when a candidate
is willing to run under their banner. Party leaders are high-sophisticates who probably know
which party judicial candidates are affiliated with. When a judicial candidate actually runs
under their party’s banner, party leaders may feel obligated to provide support similar to what
they would provide for any other candidate of their party. For instance, one might imagine a
word-of-mouth campaign to the party rank-and-file, or the parties become willing to include the
judicial candidate on the party voting guide. It is unknown whether or not this happens, but it
is possible and warrants further research.
It is probable that there is at least some direct effect of the judicial campaign on voters,
even if it is in conjunction with party activities. Still, even politically attentive citizens are not
likely to be exposed to the judicial campaign more than a handful of times. Do these citizens
actually remember the name of the candidate and to which party that candidate belongs, or do
citizens engage in on-line processing? For example, perhaps Republican voters have forgotten
the advertisement where a judicial candidate touted herself as a Republican, but they still have
a positive feeling towards the name when they go to vote.17
Finally, when a quasi-partisan campaign is run is likely to be non-random. Judicial candidates
probably act strategically. It is worth noting that the Minnesota Republican party, despite being
the litigant in the White decisions, did not take advantage of their hard-won right to endorse
judicial candidates until 2010. At first glance this is odd, but it makes sense when the specific
17 One might recall the large number of respondents in Campbell et al.’s (1960) study who could only respond
that they ’just liked’ Eisenhower or Stevenson, without being able to explain why.
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electoral contexts involved are considered. White was decided in June of 2002, too late for the
party to really begin to push candidates for the Minnesota Supreme Court. The next three
elections were not good years for Minnesota Republicans; Kerry captured the state in 2004,
and Democrats enjoyed two very good years in 2006 and 2008. Given that the time period was
a bad one for Minnesota Republicans, it is no surprise that the Minnesota Republican party
decided not to burden their preferred candidates with the party’s endorsement. Greg Wersal,
the Minnesota lawyer whose desire to run for the bench as a Republican precipitated the fall of
judicial speech regulations, declined to run from 2004 to 2008. However, Wersal did run in 2010,
and he ran an openly quasi-partisan campaign (Karnowski, 2010). It seems likely that when
a quasi-partisan election occurs is not random, but systematic due to candidates and parties
acting in a strategic fashion. Further study is needed to determine precisely when candidates
choose to run quasi-partisan campaigns.
Conclusion
This study has provided evidence that when a quasi-partisan election occurs, the structure
of voting at the precinct level becomes more partisan. This study has also provided evidence
that this effect is relatively substantial, especially compared to the effect of partisanship in truly
non-partisan elections.From one perspective this is a positive development; more citizens are
able to cast rational ballots in quasi-partisan elections than truly non-partisan ones.18
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was the decisive vote in White. Since, Justice O’Connor
has come to regret her vote. She has expressed concerns that the decision has undermined non-
partisan judicial election systems as well as judicial independence. Justice O’Connor, in reference
to the White decision, reportedly stated that “Sometimes we [the Supreme Court] just don’t get
it right”(Hirsch, 2006). This study cannot answer whether or not White was correctly decided in
a constitutional sense, but Justice O’Connor’s concerns are valid in at least one respect. White
opened the door for quasi-partisan judicial elections. And quasi-partisan elections, for better or
worse, undermine non-partisan judicial election system.
18 However, see Ellis and Stimson, 2012.
16
Appendix
Appendix of Tables
Table 3: OLS Random Effects Results, Full
Variable Coefficient
(p-value)
Precinct Partisanship 0.143
(0.000)
Precinct Partisanship:Quasi-Partisan 0.362
(0.000)
Non-White 0.109
(0.000)
Education -0.008
(0.555)
Population 0.0005
(0.000)
Swandal 2010 MN 1.21
(.215)
Wersal 2010 MN -2.55
(0.002)
Edmunds 2008 NC 0.775
(0.214)
Gildea 2008 MN 26.36
(0.000)
Tingelstad 2008 MN 11.3
(0.000)
Youkin 2004 MT -4.83
(0.000)
McLean 2004 MT 14.85
(0.000)
Anderson 2000 MN 38.75
(0.000)
Blatz 2000 MN 43.48
(0.000)
Eismann 2000 ID 2.99
(0.003)
Overall R-squared = .6684
N = 2,338 observations in 860 groups
P-values are two-tailed
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean/Median One Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
GOP Judicial Vote 53.9 13.7 96 11.9
Precinct Partisanship 50.6 17.6 93 0.6
Precinct Partisanship:Quasi-Partisan 30.7 29.5 93 0
Non-White 21.03 23.3 98.99 0
Education 26.5 15.4 87.2 1.9
Population 2,074.9 1,618 15,216 39
Quasi-Partisan 1 (Median) NA 1 0
Note that 59.05 percent of all observations have a value of 1 for the quasi-partisan variable
(indicating that the contest the observation is from is quasi-partisan). Conversely, 40.95 percent
of all observations had a value of 0 for the quasi-partisan variable.
Table 5: Diagnostic Regression, Non-Partisan Cases
Candidate State Year Coefficient P-Value
McLean Montana 2004 .28 0.000
Tingelstad Minnesota 2008 .16 0.000
Anderson Minnesota 2000 .92 0.300
Gildea Minnesota 2008 -.01 0.500
Blatz Minnesota 2000 -.19 0.000
P-values are two-tailed
The coefficients represent the direct effect of partisanship on the dependent variable when
the regression is run with data from only that contest.
Table 6: Diagnostic Regression, Quasi-Partisan Cases
Candidate State Year Coefficient P-Value
Eismann Idaho 2000 .91 0.000
Younkin Montana 2004 .61 0.000
Wersal Minnesota 2010 .47 0.000
Swandal Montana 2010 .44 0.000
Edmunds North Carolina 2008 .317 0.000
Jackson North Carolina 2010 .255 0.000
P-values are two-tailed
The coefficients represent the direct effect of partisanship on the dependent variable when
the regression is run with data from only that contest
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Table 7: OLS Random Effects Results, excluding Blatz (MN, 2000)
Variable Coefficient
(p-value)
Precinct Partisanship 0.13
(0.000)
Precinct Partisanship:Quasi-Partisan 0.40
(0.000)
Non-White 0.10
(0.000)
Education -0.01
(0.289)
Population 0.0005
(0.317)
Overall R-squared = .7018
N = 2,073
P-values are two-tailed
Table 8: OLS Random Effects Results, excluding Eismann(ID, 2000)
Variable Coefficient
(p-value)
Precinct Partisanship 0.98
(0.000)
Precinct Partisanship:Quasi-Partisan 0.30
(0.000)
Non-White 0.05
(0.000)
Education 0.02
(0.126)
Population 0.0005
(0.007)
Overall R-squared = .687
N = 2,151
P-values are two-tailed
Table 9: OLS Random Effects Results, excluding Eismann and Blatz
Variable Coefficient
(p-value)
Precinct Partisanship 0.91
(0.000)
Precinct Partisanship:Quasi-Partisan 0.359
(0.000)
Non-White 0.05
(0.000)
Education 0.02
(0.007)
Population -0.0005
(0.000)
Overall R-squared = .722
N = 1,866
P-values are two-tailed
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